Daily Event for January 26, 2015

Continued from Jan. 25...

The convoy, JW-56A, continued to head toward Murmansk and the U-boats continued their attack (Although the Germans identified it as PQ-25.). With the number of reports about the location of the convoy, the Germans thought knew exactly where to find them. Because of how close Murmansk was the Germans also knew they had little time to attack before other ships could be sent from Russia to defend the convoy. Just after midnight on January 26, 1944 the third ship was hit.

Oberleutnant zur See Hans Dunkelberg in U-716 let loose three torpedoes and at least one hit the U.S. Liberty ship Andrew G. Curtin. One hit was all it took to doom the ship. Even though the engines and boilers were not damaged, they were shut down immediately. The ship began to break in half forward of #3 hold and after she was abandoned she did brake in half and sank. The sixty-eight survivors got off the ship in 4 lifeboats and 1 raft, however one of the lifeboats capsized upon hitting the water. Those in the boat were saved, but three men (two men who had jumped overboard and one of the Armed Guard) perished. A distress call had been sent and was answered by HMS Inconstant H-49 and all the survivors were soon picked up. The ship had been carrying 9,000 tons of cargo and steel in her holds. There were also 2 locomotives, 2 tenders and 2 U.S. built PT boats as deck cargo. At least one of the PT boats broke free from the ship and floated away.

Within minutes of that attack Kapitänleutnant Klaus-Helmuth Becker and U-360 fired three torpedoes at the convoy hitting the British freighter Fort Bellingham. Becker had damaged HMS Obdurate G-39 hours before, and this was his second target. These would be the only two ships Becker ever hit. While Becker claimed to hear three explosions, the men on board heard only one. Whether one or two torpedoes hit the ship is not completely clear, however the damage done was extensive. The engine room bulkhead collapsed, both boilers ruptured and the main steam pipe fractured filling the compartment with live steam. The engines stopped and the ship lost all power, two lifeboats were destroyed and of course she was taking on water. The damage could have been far worse as the ship's manifest shows she was carrying 50 tons of cordite among her 4,000 tons of stores.

The crew abandoned the ship before such orders were given, several in a lifeboat others on rafts, and two jumped into the sea. Three other men jumped on to HMS Offa G-29, which had come alongside and even collided with the ship. HMS Offa remained nearby and removed the remaining survivors, including the Convoy Commodore, Commander Ivan W. Whitehorn, R.N. and the master, James N. Maley. In all thirty-six men were recovered, thirty-nine men were missing.

Even though the ship was not sinking, she could not be saved. With no way to make steam she was a derelict. Attempting to tow her would have been a dangerous and unnecessary risk to other ships and their crews. HMS Offa fired torpedoes and used her guns to try and send her to the bottom, but she did not sink. She was finally sunk by U-957 some hours later.

The wolfpack continued to prowl about, but by 0700 contact with the convoy had apparently been lost by most of the boats. The last contact was made by Oberleutnant Gerd Scharr in U-957 when he came across a debris field in which he found rafts, a cutter and the PT boat. Using his deck gun he fired on the PT boat and the cutter. To his surprise two men were seen on the PT boat, they were the two men who had jumped off the Fort Bellingham. They were taken prisoner and interrogated, the PT boat was sunk. According to the Germans the two men provided information about the convoy, including the number of ships, some of the cargo, the strength of the escorts and the date of sailing. However they "underestimated" the number of merchant ships by 25% and nearly doubled the actual number of escorts. They also gave an incorrect sailing date, moving it forward by 4 days to Jan. 8. The description of the cargo was general, no firm details, just what would normally be expected in a Russia bound convoy. All this perhaps was an attempt to fool the Germans.

Continued searches by sea and air turned up nothing. At 1355 a message was sent to the wolfpack;
"Groupe Isegrim: I am certain that you will continue to do your utmost: remember your comrades on the Eastern Front."
-Signed Dönitz.

The message from Dönitz could not change the situation, his boats had failed to stop the convoy.

The Germans mustered a dozen U-boats against the convoy of twenty merchantmen, at least six of these made contact. The weather, considering that part of the world, was reasonably good and they should have had more success. Perhaps the inexperience of the U-boat commanders was partly to blame. The position reports varied widely (as much as 40 miles) and there was much confusion on the part of the Germans as to where the convoy was, or even where they really were. The U-boats did have several torpedo failures (hot runs, premature detonations and so on), but for all the effort they put into the attack, the Germans had failed to have significant victory when they needed it. Two of the boats (U-601 and U-360) were in collision around midnight on the 27th causing U-360 to return to Narvik.

At 1041 on the 27th U-boat HQ in Norway decided to call it a day and the boats were reassigned, they were not going to wait for the returning convoy, but were to get into position for the next eastbound convoy. They felt that loaded ships were more valuable to sink than empty ones.

It should be pointed out that the Royal Navy also failed, not a single U-boat was sunk, though a number of depth charge attacks were made. Including one reported by the Germans to have lasted six hours against U-965.
© 2015 Michael W. Pocock
MaritimeQuest.com



Roll of Honor
In memory of those who lost their lives in
SS Andrew G. Curtin
"As long as we embrace them in our memory, their spirit will always be with us"

Name
Rate
Notes
Simmons, Joseph E.
Utility
Verra, Tony J.
Seaman 1st Class (USNR)
Armed Guard
Yeoman, Desso
Messman


Roll of Honour
In memory of those who lost their lives in
SS Fort Bellingham
"As long as we embrace them in our memory, their spirit will always be with us"

Name
Rate
Notes
Aitcheson, Derek
Able Seaman (RN)
DEMS Gunner

Bluck, Thomas G.
Fireman
Brown, William A.
5th Engineer Officer
Browning, David
2nd Engineer Officer
Browning, Robert
Able Seaman (RN)
Burnham, William G.
Assistant Steward
Age 17
Chard, Kenneth J.
Able Seaman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Cook, Walter J.
Able Seaman
Crook, Cyril W.
Able Seaman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Day, Harry
Able Seaman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Deamer, Eric
Sailor
Denniss, John F. S.
Convoy Signalman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Dowsett, John E.
Fireman
Duckman, Thomas A.
Senior Ordinary Seaman
Dumigan, John B.
Convoy Signalman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Dunn, William R.
Carpenter
Ellard, Joseph
Boatswain
Few, William W.
Junior Ordinary Seaman
Halliday, Robert L.
Bombardier (RA)
DEMS Gunner
Isaacs, Sidney J.
Gunner (RA)
DEMS Gunner
Killinger, Eric M.
Fireman
Kirby, Kenneth
Gunner (RA)
DEMS Gunner
Large, Charles R.
Able Seaman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Lowe, Roy G.
Able Seaman
Matthews, Sidney H.
Able Seaman
McKenzie, David
Gunner (RA)
DEMS Gunner
Murray, Peter
Able Seaman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Norton, Patrick G.
Steward
Pemberton, Douglas S. W.
Bombardier (RA)
DEMS Gunner
Pollett, James E.
Senior Ordinary Seaman
Australian
Shoesmith, Walter H.
Able Seaman (RN)
DEMS Gunner
Stephen, Benjamin L.
Water Tender
Stevenson, William B.
Chief Engineer Officer
Stokes, Benjamin
Greaser
Trower, Charles E. F.
Cabin Boy
Age 17
Vaughan, Michael T.
Able Seaman
Wallace, Harvey
Gunner (RA)
DEMS Gunner
       
  RA = Royal Artillery.


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